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UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF REPEALING “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”: 





I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
To mark the one-year anniversary of the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
(“DADT”),1 President Barack Obama tweeted, “All Americans can now serve their 
country without hiding who they are.”2 While the repeal of DADT was a major 
victory for lesbian, gay, and bisexual (“LGB”) service members, the repeal did not 
apply to transgender individuals.3 In order to join the military, individuals need to 
meet the physical and psychological standards listed in the Department of Defense’s 
Medical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Military 
Services (“DoDI 6130.03”).4 If an individual cannot meet the physical and 
psychological standards listed in DoDI 6130.03, he or she is barred from entering 
into military service.5 As a result, if a transgender individual undergoes sex 
                                                 
 © 2015 Kayla Quam. J.D. Candidate 2015, S.J. Quinney College of Law. I would like 
to thank Professor Clifford Rosky for his tremendous assistance with this Note.  
1 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. 
2 Barack Obama, TWITTER (Sept. 20, 2012, 6:27 PM), https://twitter.com/BarackObama 
/status/248941554599854081, archived at http://perma.cc/NTE4-GDU7. 
3 DADT was codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed 2010). Subsection (f)(1) 
defined “homosexual” as LGB individuals, without mention of “transgender.” Id. The repeal 
of DADT, then, was silent as to transgender individuals’ rights to serve. See id. 
Transgender individuals are those who feel a disconnect between their gender identity 
and their sex assigned at birth. Stephanie Markowitz, Change of Sex Designation on 
Transsexuals’ Birth Certificates: Public Policy and Equal Protection, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 705, 709 (2008). The terms “gender” and “sex” refer to two distinct concepts. The 
term “sex” refers to biological descriptors, such as genitalia or reproductive organs. Whitney 
E. Smith, In the Footsteps of Johnson v. California: Why Classification and Segregation of 
Transgender Inmates Warrants Heightened Scrutiny, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 689, 692–
93 (2012). In contrast, the term “gender” refers to “society’s social categorization of 
maleness or femaleness through traits, social roles, and appearance, regardless of actual 
genitalia.” Id. at 693. Gender identity, then, is defined as an “internal sense of one’s own 
gender.” Barb J. Burdge, A Phenomenology of Transgenderism as a Valued Life Experience 
Among Transgender Adults in the Midwestern United States 4 (July 2013) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University), available at https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream 
/handle/1805/4026/Dissertation_Burdge_FINAL.pdf?sequence=1, archived at http://perma. 
cc/3XYV-MND7. 
4 Department of Defense Instruction No. 6130.03 (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter DoDI 
6130.03], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/613003p.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/T2JC-8YD5.  
5 See Matthew F. Kerrigan, Transgender Discrimination in the Military: The New Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 500, 506–07 (2012). While DoDI 6130.03 
722 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
reassignment surgery (“SRS”) and/or hormone therapy to physically present as his 
or her gender identity, that individual is excluded from the military under the 
physical health provision of DoDI 6130.03 (the SRS and hormone therapy being the 
disqualifying factors). On the other hand, if one merely identifies himself or herself 
as a transgender individual, that individual is excluded from the military under the 
psychological provision of DoDI 6130.03 (the transgender identification being the 
disqualifying factor). For transgender individuals seeking to join the military, it is 
the proverbial Catch-22. While there are an estimated 15,450 transgender 
individuals serving in the military and an estimated 134,350 transgender veterans,6 
had the military known these service members were transgender, they would have 
been prohibited from serving.  
This Note argues that DoDI 6130.03’s blanket ban on transgender individuals 
is unconstitutional because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Part II of this Note provides background information on DoDI 
6130.03. Part III analyzes a circuit split to determine whether discrimination based 
on gender identity is discrimination based on sex. Part III concludes that 
discrimination against transgender individuals is inherently a form of sex 
discrimination and that intermediate scrutiny should apply in analyzing the 
constitutionality of DoDI 6130.03. Part IV, in applying intermediate scrutiny, 
considers three potential governmental interests for DoDI 6130.03: (1) unit 
cohesion, (2) maintaining physical health within the military, and (3) maintaining 
psychological health within the military. This Note concludes that while these 
governmental interests are important, DoDI 6130.03 is not substantially related to 
these interests, and, therefore, DoDI 6130.03 fails intermediate scrutiny. 
 
II.  THE MILITARY’S BAN ON TRANSGENDER SERVICE MEMBERS 
 
The physical health provision of DoDI 6130.03 banning transgender 
individuals from enlisting provides that a “[h]istory of major abnormalities or 
defects of the genitalia[,] including but not limited to change of sex,” is a 
disqualifying condition to military entrance.7 The psychological health provision of 
DoDI 6130.03 banning transgender individuals from enlisting provides that a 
“current or history of psychosexual conditions, . . . including but not limited to 
transsexualism, exhibitionism, transvestism, voyeurism, and other paraphilias,” is a 
disqualifying condition to military entrance.8 Therefore, the “prohibition against 
transgender service includes a physical component (‘change of sex’) and a 
                                                 
applies to all military branches, each individual branch of the military also has its own 
regulations that ban transgender individuals from serving. Id.  
6 JOYCELYN ELDERS & ALAN M. STEINMAN, PALM CTR., REPORT OF THE 
TRANSGENDER MILITARY SERVICE COMMISSION 5 (2014), available at 
http://www.palmcenter.org/files/Transgender%20Military%20Service%20Report.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/KBQ8-TBTK.  
7 See DoDI 6130.03, supra note 4, §§ E4.14(f), E4.15(r) (stating standards for female 
and male genitalia, respectively). 
8 Id. § E4.29(r). 
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psychological component (‘transsexualism’).”9 The military conducts periodic 
physical examinations, so if a transgender individual transitions physically to the sex 
not assigned at birth after enlisting, such changes would not go unnoticed.10  
Medical regulations generally allow for waivers of accession standards, or 
military entrance standards, such as DoDI 6130.03. These regulations “specify, 
however, that waivers will not be granted for conditions that would disqualify an 
individual for the possibility of retention.”11 Until recently, the relevant retention 
standard, the Department of Defense’s Physical Disability Evaluation Instruction 
(“DoDI 1332.38”) specifically listed “Sexual Gender and Identity Disorders” as a 
condition that rendered one ineligible for a physical disability evaluation, meaning 
the military conclusively presumed transgender individuals were unfit for service.12 
While DoDI 1332.38 was replaced in 2014 by the Department of Defense’s 
Disability Evaluation System (“DoDI 1332.18”),13 even under this new regulation, 
“some conditions related to transgender identity are grounds for discharge, and 
because recruiters cannot waive a condition upon enlistment that would be 
disqualifying for retention, transgender individuals cannot obtain medical waivers 
for entrance into the military.”14 
To determine the constitutionality of DoDI 6130.03, this Note considers the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Due Process Clause requires that 
the federal government treat all persons who are similarly situated alike.15 The Due 
Process Clause has an implied equal protection requirement, similar to the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,16 in which the government must 
                                                 
9 GALE S. POLLOCK & SHANNON MINTER, PALM CTR., REPORT OF THE PLANNING 
COMMISSION ON TRANSGENDER MILITARY SERVICE 8 (2014), available at http://www.palm 
center.org/files/Report%20of%20Planning%20Commission%20on%20Transgender%20Mi
litary%20Service.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y33A-KQ9Y. 
10 Allison Ross, Note, The Invisible Army: Why the Military Needs to Rescind Its Ban 
on Transgender Service Members, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 185, 191 (2014). 
11 POLLOCK & MINT, supra note 9, at 8. 
12 See Department of Defense Instruction No. 1332.38, § E5.1.2.9.7 (Nov. 14, 1996), 
available at http://www.goodasyou.org/DODInstruction.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HP 
R5-Z4TW; see also ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 8–9 (stating that DoDI 1332.38 
implies that “‘sexual gender and identity disorders’ interfere with assignment or performance 
of duty”). 
13 See Department of Defense Instruction No. 1332.18 (Aug. 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/133218p.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A5 
UV-H4WC. 
14 POLLOCK & MINTER, supra note 9, at 8. 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 
439 (1985). 
16 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam) (“Equal protection analysis 
in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth 
Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal 
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 
(1954) (“But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our 
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avoid arbitrary classifications that are based on a “bare congressional desire to harm 
a politically unpopular group.”17 Because the analysis is the same for the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment,18 this Note will analyze case law under both clauses. 
In order for DoDI 6130.03 to meet constitutional muster, the governmental 
interest in passing the law or policy must be justified by a sufficient purpose.19 What 
constitutes a sufficient purpose depends on the type of discrimination and the class 
of persons toward whom the discrimination is directed.20 The Supreme Court has 
held that sex discrimination is subject to intermediate scrutiny.21 The question 
remains whether discrimination based on gender identity is a form of discrimination 
based on sex. 
 
III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON DISCRIMINATION BASED ON GENDER IDENTITY 
 
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have reached opposite conclusions on the 
issue of whether discrimination based on gender identity is a form of sex 
discrimination. The Tenth Circuit held that discrimination based on gender identity 
is not a form of sex discrimination because of the binary nature of sex (male or 
female genitalia), but the Eleventh Circuit held that discrimination based on gender 
identity is a form of sex discrimination. For the reasons explained below, this Note 
finds the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis more persuasive. 
 
A.  The Tenth Circuit: Discrimination Based on Gender Identity Is Not a Form  
of Sex Discrimination 
 
In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority,22 the Tenth Circuit held that discrimination 
based on gender identity does not constitute sex discrimination.23 In Etsitty, the 
plaintiff, Krystal Etsitty, was assigned male at birth, but identified as a woman.24 
Outside of work, Etsitty lived as a woman, and she25 eventually began taking 
hormones to prepare for SRS.26 Four years after starting hormone therapy, Etsitty 
                                                 
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive.”). 
17 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
18 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
19 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 685 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
20 Id. at 686–87. 
21 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). For the law to be upheld under 
intermediate scrutiny, the governmental interest for the law must be important and 
substantially related to the law. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 441 (1985).  
22 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
23 Id. at 1221. 
24 See id. at 1218–20. 
25 This Note uses the gender pronoun in accordance with one’s gender identity. 
26 Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218. 
2015] UNFINISHED BUSINESS 725 
 
was hired by Utah Transit Authority (“UTA”).27 During her training at UTA, Etsitty 
presented herself as male, which included using the men’s restroom.28 Soon after 
she was hired, Etsitty informed her supervisor that she was transgender and that she 
would soon be appearing as a female.29 Soon thereafter, Etsitty was fired.30 Etsitty 
filed suit against UTA for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31  
Etsitty argued she was discriminated against based on sex because (1) she was 
a transsexual32 and (2) she failed to conform to expectations of stereotypical male 
behavior.33 The Tenth Circuit rejected Etsitty’s first argument, holding that 
“discrimination against a transsexual because she is a transsexual is not 
‘discrimination because of sex.’”34 The court further stated, “In light of the 
traditional binary conception of sex, transsexuals may not claim protection under 
Title VII from discrimination based solely on their status as a transsexual.”35 In 
support of this binary concept of sex, the Tenth Circuit relied on Ulane v. Eastern 
Airlines, Inc.,36 Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.,37 and Holloway v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co.38 These three cases held that the definition of sex should be given 
its traditional interpretation based on which genitalia was assigned at birth.39 Hence, 
Etsitty’s claim of Title VII protection because of her status as a transsexual was 
rejected.40 
                                                 
27 Id. at 1218–19. 
28 Id. at 1219.  
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 This Note considers the Title VII claim in Etsitty because the Title VII analysis is 
similar to the equal protection analysis. Id. at 1227 (“In disparate-treatment discrimination 
suits, the elements of a plaintiff’s case are the same whether that case is brought under §§ 
1981 or 1983 or Title VII.” (quoting Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1307 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. 
& Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006))). The Etsitty court split the opinion into two 
parts: the Title VII claim and the equal protection claim. Id. at 1220, 1227. Most of the 
analysis occurred under the Title VII claim, but the court stated the equal protection claim 
failed for the same reasons discussed in the Title VII section. Id. at 1227–28.  
32 The term transsexual is a “subset of persons who fall under the larger umbrella of 
transgender.” Adrien Fox, The Military Hierarchy as a Means to Demystify Gender Non-
Conformance and Promote Social Acceptance, 7 CRIT 30, 32 (2014). Transsexual individuals 
generally present in a gender different from their gender at birth, or they desire to do so. Id. 
33 Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218.  
34 Id. at 1222. 
35 Id. 
36 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
37 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
38 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 
as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).  
39 Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221. 
40 Id. at 1227. 
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Etsitty then argued that even if transsexuals were not entitled to Title VII 
protection, she was entitled to protection as a biological male who was discriminated 
against for failure to conform to sex stereotypes—that is, her failure to act and appear 
according to expectations defined by gender.41 To support this argument, Etsitty 
cited the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.42 In Price 
Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, a female senior manager, was denied partnership in an 
accounting firm because she was considered “macho.”43 One partner at the firm 
advised her to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”44 The Supreme Court noted 
Hopkins was not overlooked for the partnership because she was a female but 
because she was not appearing and behaving femininely enough.45 In so noting, the 
Supreme Court held sex discrimination did not refer exclusively to discrimination 
based on biological sex but that sex discrimination could also encompass 
discrimination based on sex stereotypes.46 Specifically, the Court stated, “[W]e are 
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group . . . .”47 
In response to Etsitty’s argument that her employment termination was sex 
discrimination under Price Waterhouse, the Tenth Circuit stated, “[We] need not 
decide whether discrimination based on an employee’s failure to conform to sex 
stereotypes always constitutes discrimination ‘because of sex’ . . . . [W]e assume, 
without deciding, that such a claim is available and that Etsitty has satisfied her 
prima facie burden.”48 The court then looked to whether UTA could offer a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Etsitty’s termination.49 UTA stated the 
reason for Etsitty’s employment termination was UTA’s fear of liability, owing to 
Etsitty’s use of the female restroom.50 Etsitty, however, argued that terminating her 
employment because she intended to use the women’s restroom is “essentially 
another way of stating that she was terminated for failing to conform to sex 
stereotypes.”51 Without much explanation, the Tenth Circuit rejected Etsitty’s 
argument: “However far Price Waterhouse reaches, this court cannot conclude it 
requires employers to allow biological males to use women’s restrooms.”52 Without 
specifying what would constitute sex-stereotype discrimination under Price 
                                                 
41 Id. at 1222–23. 
42 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
881 (2014). 
43 Id. at 235.  
44 Id. (citations omitted). 
45 Id. at 250–51. 
46 Id. at 251. 
47 Id. 
48 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007).  
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
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Waterhouse, the Tenth Circuit concluded UTA’s proffered reasons of concern over 
Etsitty’s restroom usage was not discriminatory on the basis of sex.53 
  
B.  The Eleventh Circuit: Discrimination Based on Gender Identity Is a Form  
of Sex Discrimination 
 
In Glenn v. Brumby,54 by contrast, the Eleventh Circuit held discrimination 
based on gender identity, or failure to conform to sex stereotypes, constituted 
discrimination based on sex.55 In that case, plaintiff Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn was 
assigned male at birth but in 2005, she began transitioning to a female under the 
supervision of health care providers and was planning on undergoing SRS.56 During 
the relevant time period, Glenn was working for the Georgia General Assembly’s 
Office of Legislative Counsel.57 In 2007, Glenn was fired after her boss, Sewell 
Brumby, learned Glenn would begin coming to work as a woman.58 Thereafter, 
Glenn sued Brumby, alleging she was discriminated against because of her sex—
including her gender identity and her failure to conform to sex stereotypes associated 
with the male sex—in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.59  
Agreeing with Glenn’s contention, the Eleventh Circuit held discrimination 
against someone on the basis of his or her failure to conform to sex stereotypes 
constitutes sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.60 In so holding, 
the Eleventh Circuit relied on Price Waterhouse. The Glenn court stated, “Prior to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse, several courts concluded that 
Title VII afforded no protection to transgender victims of sex discrimination,” and 
cited to Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane.61 The Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected 
this line of analysis, stating, “[F]ederal courts have recognized with near-total 
uniformity that ‘the approach in Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane . . . has been 
eviscerated’ by Price Waterhouse’s holding that ‘Title VII’s reference to “sex” 
encompasses . . . discrimination based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender 
norms.’”62 In recognizing that sex discrimination encompasses failure to conform to 
sex stereotypes, the Eleventh Circuit noted, “[a] person is defined as transgender 
precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender 
stereotypes.”63 Therefore, “discrimination against a transgender individual because  
 
                                                 
53 Id.  
54 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). 
55 Id. at 1320. 




60 Id. at 1316. 
61 Id. at 1318 n.5. 
62 Id. (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004)); see infra 
notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
63 Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316. 
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of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as being 
on the basis of sex or gender.”64 
After holding the termination of Glenn’s employment was a type of sex 
discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to determine if the 
termination was substantially related to important governmental interests.65 The sole 
justification Brumby advanced for Glenn’s termination was that other women might 
object to Glenn’s use of the women’s restroom, resulting in lawsuits.66 The Eleventh 
Circuit rejected Brumby’s advanced justification because there was insufficient 
evidence to show the termination was motivated by the purported concern.67 First, 
the workplace had single-occupancy restrooms, which mitigated concern that 
women would feel uncomfortable and protest such restroom usage.68 Second, 
Brumby testified that he thought the possibility of a lawsuit by a coworker was 
unlikely but that it was a “conceivable” explanation for the firing.69 As a hypothetical 
justification does not survive intermediate scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit declared, 
“Brumby has advanced no other reason that could qualify as a governmental 
purpose, much less an ‘important’ governmental purpose . . . .”70 Therefore, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded the termination of Glenn’s employment failed to satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny.71 
 
C.  Discrimination Based on Gender Identity Is a Form of Sex Discrimination 
 
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is more persuasive than the Tenth Circuit’s 
because under Price Waterhouse, the concept of “sex” encompasses more than one’s 
genitalia. If one scrutinizes the underlying rationale for discrimination against 
transgender individuals, it becomes apparent that the discrimination is based on 
either one’s sex or one’s failure to conform to traditional sex stereotypes. Either way, 
post-Price Waterhouse, intermediate scrutiny should apply to discrimination based 
on gender identity. 
First, in Etsitty, the Tenth Circuit cited Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane, all of 
which were decided by 1984.72 The Tenth Circuit failed to recognize that Price 
Waterhouse, decided in 1989, implicitly overruled these three cases. As the Eleventh 
Circuit explained, the approaches in Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane have been 
“eviscerated” by Price Waterhouse’s holding that sex discrimination encompasses 
                                                 
64 Id. at 1317. 
65 Id. at 1320. 





71 Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary 
judgment in favor of Glenn on her sex discrimination claim. Id. 
72 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007); see supra notes 
36–38 (Holloway was decided in 1977, Sommers in 1982, and Ulane in 1984).  
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discrimination based on one’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes.73 Price 
Waterhouse and its progeny recognize that “sex” encompasses more than one’s 
genitalia.74 Furthermore, the Etsitty court looked solely at the statutory language of 
Title VII’s use of “sex” and concluded that the definition of sex should be given its 
traditional meaning—male if born with male genitalia, female if born with female 
genitalia.75 Yet the Supreme Court has explicitly stated sex discrimination includes 
discrimination based on sex stereotypes.76 This expands the traditional statutory 
definition of “sex.” Anne Hopkins was not denied partnership because she was 
female; she was denied partnership because she was not acting feminine enough.77 
The Etsitty court ignored this expanded definition of sex when it looked exclusively 
to the traditional definition of sex.  
Although Price Waterhouse was based on an interpretation of Title VII, there 
is no reason to think the concept of sex discrimination is narrower under the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On the contrary, the Court has 
repeatedly held the Constitution’s prohibitions against sex discrimination prevent 
the government from relying on sex stereotypes. In United States v. Virginia,78 for 
example, the Court observed that in order to justify discrimination based on sex, the 
government “must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and females.”79 
Second, if one scrutinizes the rationale underlying DoDI 6130.03, it becomes 
apparent that such discrimination is either sex discrimination based on one’s genitals 
or discrimination based on one’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes. Consider a 
                                                 
73 Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1318 n.5 (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th 
Cir. 2004)).  
74 See, e.g., Laura Anne Taylor, Note, A Win for Transgender Employees: Chevron 
Deference for the EEOC’s Decision in Macy v. Holder, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1165, 1176 
(“Despite the negative treatment of transgender sex discrimination claims by the Ulane court, 
the general trend is toward the recognition of some Title VII protection for transgender 
plaintiffs.”). Similar to the Eleventh Circuit and Price Waterhouse, other circuits and courts 
have recognized that sex discrimination encompasses discrimination based on one’s failure 
to conform to traditional sex stereotypes. See, e.g., Smith, 378 F.3d at 575; Schwenk v. 
Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 
F.3d 213, 214–15 (1st Cir. 2000); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 
F. Supp. 2d 653, 667–68 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 
1435995, at *5–6 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).  
75 Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1222. 
76 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (plurality opinion), 
superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized 
in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). 
77 Id. at 235 (“[I]n order to improve her chances for partnership . . . Hopkins [was 
advised to] ‘walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.’” (citations omitted)). 
78 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
79 Id. at 533. 
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female-to-male individual80 who undergoes SRS: the only barrier to his entry in the 
military is the sex assigned at birth (or, depending on how you look at it, the genitalia 
post-surgery). After Price Waterhouse, courts are “recognizing that if it is wrong to 
discriminate against a person because she is [a] woman, it is also wrong to 
discriminate against a person for becoming a woman.”81 As one court explained, this 
principle is clear when sex is analogized to religion:  
 
Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts from 
Christianity to Judaism. Imagine too that her employer testifies that he 
harbors no bias toward either Christians or Jews but only “converts.” That 
would be a clear case of discrimination “because of religion.” No court 
would take seriously the notion that “converts” are not covered by the 
statute. Discrimination “because of religion” easily encompasses 
discrimination because of a change of religion. But in cases where the 
plaintiff has changed her sex, . . . courts have traditionally carved such 
persons out of the statute by concluding that “transsexuality” is 
unprotected . . . .82 
 
Similarly, consider a transgender individual who foregoes SRS but instead 
dresses as his or her gender identity. The ban on military enlistment is based solely 
on the individual’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes. If an employer cannot 
discriminate against a woman for failing to appear femininely, an employer likewise 
cannot discriminate against a male for appearing femininely: 
 
After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against 
women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is 
engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur 
but for the victim’s sex. It follows that employers who discriminate against 
men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act 
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the 
discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.83 
 
As the Eleventh Circuit court noted in Glenn, a person is defined as transgender 
precisely because his or her behavior transgresses gender norms.84 Indeed, one 
definition of transgenderism is “behavior [that] does not conform to that typically 
associated with the sex to which they were assigned at birth.”85 But, as laid out in 
                                                 
80 A transgender individual who was born with female genitalia but who identifies as a 
male is referred to as a female-to-male. ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 5. A 
transgender individual who was born with male genitalia but who identifies as a female is 
referred to as a male-to-female. Id. 
81 Smith, supra note 3, at 719. 
82 Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306–07 (D.D.C. 2008). 
83 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004). 
84 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011). 
85 Ross, supra note 10, at 188 (citations omitted). 
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Price Waterhouse, an employer cannot discriminate against an employee based on 
the employee’s failure to adhere to sex stereotypes.86  
Transgender individuals are either excluded from the military under DoDI 
6130.03 because of the genitalia they are assigned at birth (discrimination based on 
sex) or because they are acting against the typical gender norms applied to either or 
both sexes (discrimination based on sex stereotypes). In either case, they are 
discriminated against based on sex, and therefore, intermediate scrutiny applies.87 
 
IV.  THE MILITARY’S BAN VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
 
This Part applies intermediate scrutiny to DoDI 6130.03. It analyzes three 
possible governmental interests for DoDI 6130.03: (1) unit cohesion, (2) physical 
health, and (3) psychological health.88 This Part concludes that while unit cohesion 
and maintaining physical and psychological health within the military are important 
governmental interests, DoDI 6130.03 is not substantially related to them. 
Therefore, DoDI 6130.03 fails intermediate scrutiny. 
 
A.  First Governmental Interest: Unit Cohesion 
 
The first potential government justification for the exclusion of transgender 
individuals is ensuring unit cohesion.89 Unit cohesion is defined as “the bonds of 
trust among individual service members.”90 The fear is that inclusion of transgender 
individuals would (1) disrupt morale and good order91 and (2) make nontransgender 
personnel uncomfortable due to the nonprivate environment of the military.92 While 
unit cohesion is an important governmental interest, for the reasons listed below, 
DoDI 6130.03 is not substantially related to it. 
                                                 
86 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion), 
superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized 
in Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). 
87 See supra notes 21, 74–79 and accompanying text. 
88 ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 6 (“US military policies that ban transgender 
service members do not include rationales that explain why the armed forces prohibit them 
from serving, although the policies are embedded in comprehensive medical and other 
regulations that are designed, broadly speaking, to preserve health and good order.”). 
89 Ross, supra note 10, at 203.  
90 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(7) (2006) (repealed 2010) (“One of the most critical 
elements in combat capability is unit cohesion, that is, the bonds of trust among individual 
service members . . . .”).  
91 See, e.g., id. § 654(a)(14) (“The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that 
exclude persons whose presence in the armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to the 
armed forces’ high standards of morale, good order and discipline . . . .”). 
92 See, e.g., id. § 654(a)(12) (“The worldwide deployment of United States military 
forces, the international responsibilities of the United States, and the potential for 
involvement of the armed forces in actual combat routinely make it necessary for members 
of the armed forces involuntarily to accept living conditions and working conditions that are 
. . . characterized by forced intimacy with little or no privacy.”).  
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First, other countries have included transgender individuals in their militaries, 
so examining the effect of such inclusion can provide insight into the effect it would 
have in the United States. Openly transgender service members are accepted by 
eighteen countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.93 For these countries, there have been 
few reports on the impact of the inclusion of transgender personnel, and none have 
reversed their inclusion policy.94 The United States should adopt an inclusive policy 
that allows for openly transgender service members, just as eighteen other countries 
have. As “the U.S. military has previously compared itself to foreign countries in 
order to justify its bans on [LGB individuals] in the military, it seems equally 
appropriate that the United States compare itself to foreign countries as a way of 
justifying the removal of the ban on transgender service members.”95 
Additionally, research focusing on the effects of the military’s inclusion of 
openly LGB individuals provides insight into the likely impact of the military’s 
inclusion of transgender individuals, as the previous justifications for exclusion of 
openly LGB individuals were the same as the current justifications for the exclusion 
of transgender individuals.96 While the effects of the repeal of DADT are inchoate, 
several studies suggest allowing openly LGB members in the military has not had 
any negative impact on unit cohesion.97 One study conducted by the Palm Center98 
surveyed over 200 active-duty troops, before and after repeal of DADT, regarding 
the effect on unit cohesion, and also analyzed data from two other surveys regarding 
the same.99 The Palm Center concluded the repeal of DADT had no overall negative 
                                                 
93 M. Joycelyn Elders et al., Medical Aspects of Transgender Military Service, 41 
ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 199, 200 & 212 n.1 (2015); see Ross, supra note 10, at 206. Several 
of these countries are part of the U.S. Army NATO Brigade, suggesting U.S. service 
members have already been serving alongside transgender service members in NATO 
missions. U.S. Army NATO Brigade, U.S. ARMY EUR., http://www.usanato.army.mil/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/GT36-3BQQ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).  
94 See Ross, supra note 10, at 207. 
95 Id. at 208 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
96 See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
97 See Ross, supra note 10, at 204.  
98 The Palm Center is “a research initiative of the Department of Political Science at 
San Francisco State University [and] is committed to sponsoring state-of-the-art scholarship 
to enhance the quality of public dialogue about critical and controversial issues of the day.” 
Joycelyn Elders & Alan M. Steinman, Report of the Transgender Military Commission, 
PALM CENTER (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.palmcenter.org/publications/dadt/former_surg 
eon_general_faults_militarys_transgender_ban, archived at http://perma.cc/P4UQ-K9RA. 
Congress, in repealing DADT, relied on reports by the Palm Center. See Nathaniel Frank, 
Op-ed: How Facts and Figures Led to the End of DADT, ADVOCATE.COM (Feb. 19, 2013, 
5:25 AM), http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2013/02/19/op-ed-how-facts-and-figures 
-led-end-dadt, archived at http://perma.cc/QHH2-WE2M. 
99 Nathaniel Frank, The Last Word on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: A New Study Shows 
Repealing It Helped the Military, SLATE MAG. (Sept. 20, 2012, 7:45 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/09/study_of_don_t_ask_don
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impact on unit cohesion—in fact, greater openness and honesty resulting from the 
repeal promoted increased understanding, respect, and acceptance.100 Several other 
studies buttress the claim that allowing openly LGB individuals into the military had 
no deleterious effect on unit cohesion,101 and by extension, these same findings 
should be applied to transgender individuals.102 Further, allowing transgender 
individuals into the military may even strengthen unit cohesion because openness, 
candor, and transparency within the military strengthen the bonds of trust. Indeed, 
one study focused on the effect on unit cohesion in the Israeli military, which has a 
non-exclusionary policy.103 This study not only concluded that unit cohesion was 
not negatively affected, it also found that “[c]ommunication of personal information 
is associated with and facilitated by the experience of high levels of emotions and 
intimacy.”104  
Second, because some transgender individuals present as their gender identity, 
it is possible military personnel would be unaware a transgender personnel was born 
as a different sex than being presented, making the concern for unit cohesion 
irrelevant. To illustrate, the article, Doing Gender, Doing Heteronormativity, 
analyzed a study in which fifty-four female-to-male individuals socially transitioned 
in the workplace between 2003 and 2007.105 In that study, fourteen coworkers were 
interviewed and asked to discuss how they felt about the transition.106 After 
compiling and analyzing the coworkers’ responses, the article found transgender 
individuals’ bodies mattered little if they present as their gender identity—“their 
appearance is taken to be proof of their biological sex.”107 While some transgender 
individuals do not desire to present as their gender identity, the military should not 
automatically assume a transgender individual will not successfully do so. This is 
particularly poignant when one considers the physical, emotional, and financial 
                                                 
_t_tell_repeal_helped_the_military_.single.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2RMZ-S88U.  
100 AARON BELKIN ET AL., PALM CTR., ONE YEAR OUT: AN ASSESSMENT OF DADT 
REPEAL’S IMPACT ON MILITARY READINESS 4 (2012), available at http://www.palmcenter. 
org/files/One%20Year%20Out_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L9TY-52AY. 
101 See generally Nathaniel Frank, What Does the Empirical Research Say About the 
Impact of Openly Gay Service on the Military?, PALM CENTER. (Mar. 3, 2010), 
http://www.palmcenter.org/publications/dadt/what_does_empirical_research_say_about_i
mpact_openly_gay_service_military, archived at http://perma.cc/GG77-T8TP (“The U.S. 
military’s own researchers have consistently found that openly gay service does not 
undermine cohesion . . . . [N]o research has ever shown that open homosexuality impairs 
military readiness. This fact has been acknowledged by the Government Accountability 
Office and by the Pentagon . . . .”).  
102 See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
103 Danny Kaplan & Amir Rosenmann, Unit Social Cohesion in the Israeli Military as 
a Case Study of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 33 POL. PSYCHOL. 419, 424 (2012). 
104 Id. at 430 (citations omitted).  
105 Kristen Schilt & Laurel Westbrook, Doing Gender, Doing Heteronormativity: 
“Gender Normals,” Transgender People, and the Social Maintenance of Heterosexuality, 
23 GENDER & SOC’Y 440, 444 (2009).  
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 443. 
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sacrifices that transgender individuals often endure to have one’s physical 
appearance conform with one’s gender identity.108 
 
B.  Second Governmental Interest: Maintaining Physical Health in the Military 
 
While former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said he was “open” to reviewing 
the military prohibition on transgender service members, he stated the issue was “a 
bit more complicated because it has a medical component to it.”109 Similarly, Eileen 
Lainez, a spokeswoman for the Department of Defense, has said the military’s 
regulations do not allow transgender individuals to serve in the military “based upon 
medical standards for military service.”110 These comments highlight another 
possible justification for DoDI 6130.03—that SRS and hormone therapy would 
compromise the service member’s physical health, thereby affecting military 
readiness.111 DoDI 6130.03, however, is not substantially related to this interest. 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that the Transgender 
Military Service Commission, co-chaired by former United States Surgeon General, 
Dr. Joycelyn Elders, and sponsored by the Palm Center, released a report in March 
2014 (the “March 2014 Palm Center Report”)112 that examined all medical and 
psychological aspects of transgender military service to determine if the blanket ban 
was based on sound medical reasoning.113 The March 2014 Palm Center Report 
concluded that there is no compelling medical rationale for the blanket ban and that 
the ban is inconsistent with how the military regulates other medical and 
psychological conditions.114 
  
                                                 
108 See Markowitz, supra note 3, at 709.  
109 Helene Cooper, Hagel ‘Open’ to Reviewing Military’s Ban on Transgender People, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/us/hagel-open-to-review-
of-military-policy-on-transgender-people.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/XMH7-
W749; Katy Steinmetz, America’s Transition, TIME, June 9, 2014, at 38, 46.  
110 Adam Klasfeld, Transgenderism More Likely in Military, Study Finds, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (July 24, 2012, 5:11 AM), http://www.courthousenews.com/ 
2012/07/24/48664.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/JN88-G2VU. 
111 See ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 6–7. 
112 ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 2. A second Palm Center Report on 
transgender military service released in August 2014 provides a roadmap for the “inclusion 
of openly-serving transgender personnel in the US military.” POLLOCK & MINTER, supra 
note 9, at 2. 
113 ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 4.  
114 Id. at 3–5. 
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1.  Sex Reassignment Surgery 
 
One possible justification for the physical health provision of DoDI 6130.03 is 
that SRS causes medical complications, and the military is unwilling to gamble with 
service members’ health and military readiness.115 Although this governmental 
interest is important, DoDI 6130.03 is not substantially related to it because the 
regulation is underinclusive and overinclusive.116  
First, DoDI 6130.03 is substantially underinclusive because other types of 
nontransgender surgeries and medical conditions are just as likely, if not more likely, 
as SRS to result in medical complications. However, these nontransgender surgeries 
and medical conditions do not, per se, affect a nontransgender individual’s ability to 
serve. For example, there are 313 elective cosmetic procedures that do not affect a 
nontransgender individual’s ability to enlist.117 Some of these procedures are 
substantially more likely to result in complications than SRS, such as craniofacial 
surgery118 and mandibular osteotomies.119 When a service member undergoes one of  
 
 
                                                 
115 See id. at 6. 
116 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 690 (stating a law is not necessarily invalidated 
if the governmental interests are underinclusive or overinclusive; rather, based on the level 
of scrutiny, a closer fit is required). In evaluating whether the law is justified by a sufficient 
governmental purpose, courts focus “on the degree to which a law is underinclusive and/or 
overinclusive.” Id. at 689. “A law is underinclusive if it does not apply to individuals who 
are similar to those to whom the law applies . . . . A law is overinclusive if it applies to those 
who need not be included in order for the government to achieve its purpose.” Id. at 689–90. 
117 ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 25 n.56 (noting there are “313 allowable, 
elective cosmetic procedures”); TRICARE MGMT. ACTIVITY, UNIF. BUS. OFFICE, 
PROVIDER’S GUIDE TO THE ELECTIVE COSMETIC SURGERY SUPERBILL (2013) (outlining the 
types of elective procedures available in the Military Health System). 
118 Craniofacial surgery is defined as “[h]ead and face reconstruction . . . to repair or 
reshape deformities of the head and face.” See John A. Daller, Head and Face 
Reconstruction, MEDLINEPLUS (May 5, 2013), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/ 
article/002980.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/C2YF-3EQY (listing potential 
complications such as bleeding, infection, nerve or brain damage, “[n]eed for follow-up 
surgery,” “[p]artial or total loss of bone grafts,” and “[p]ermanent scarring”). 
119 Mandibular osteotomy is a cosmetic jaw surgery in which: 
 
[t]he back of the lower jaw is split bilaterally under general anesthetic in the 
region of the wisdom teeth, which are generally removed in a separate operation 
at least 6 [sic] months prior to corrective surgery. . . . The bone is fixed in its new 
position by screws which are inserted through tiny external skin incisions which 
are located at the angle of the jaw. 
 
Cosmetic Jaw Surgery, MAXFAC.COM, http://www.maxfac.com/facial/jaw.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8L6F-37LM (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (mentioning several complications 
associated with mandibular osteotomy, including nerve damage and limited movement of 
the lower lip). 
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these cosmetic procedures, it is the service member’s responsibility to alert their unit 
commander of any health complications that arise.120 If such complications do arise, 
the service member’s ability to serve is addressed on an individualized, case-by-case 
basis, potentially allowing for a waiver of the accession standards.121 Another 
example of how DoDI 6130.03 is underinclusive is pregnancy. Pregnancy “accounts 
for 58% of hospitalizations among active-duty” women122 and can cause serious 
medical complications.123 Nevertheless, pregnancy is not a disqualifying condition: 
the military policies stress that it is a woman’s responsibility to plan her pregnancy 
around her military duties and to alert her superiors if medical complications arise.124 
An individual-assessment policy should be applied to transgender individuals 
because such a policy would accomplish the governmental interest of maintaining 
physical health in the military without prohibiting an entire class of people from 
serving their country.  
Second, DoDI 6130.03 is overinclusive with respect to the potential 
governmental concern that SRS would compromise physical health within the 
military, because the majority of transgender individuals do not undergo SRS, and 
of the ones who undergo SRS, the rate of medical complications that would interfere 
with military readiness is low. According to a recent study, only one-third of 
transgender individuals seek SRS.125 As a result, the blanket ban improperly 
excludes two-thirds of transgender individuals whose health is not compromised by 
SRS surgery. Of the one-third of transgender individuals who undergo SRS, the risks 
of complications from the surgery remain considerably low.126 In fact, the March 
2014 Palm Center Report analyzed several studies on the potential complications 
following SRS and applied the findings of the studies to the current figures for the 
military.127 The March 2014 Palm Report concluded that of the estimated 15,450 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Army, Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy 6 
(2012) (“Soldiers are responsible to ensure that the commander is made aware of problems 
that affect discipline, morale, and mission effectiveness . . . .”). 
121 See ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 8; see also supra notes 11–14 and 
accompanying text.  
122 Mark Thompson, Women in Combat: Vive a Différence, TIME, Jan. 25, 2013, 
http://nation.time.com/2013/01/25/women-in-combat-vive-a-difference/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/VK6U-URP9.  
123 Some of the pregnancy complications include hypertension, gestational diabetes 
mellitus, and anemia. Pregnancy Complications, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregcomplicat 
ions.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/GEC7-NAP8 (last updated Jan. 22, 2014). Women may 
die as a result of complications during and following pregnancy. In 2013, the maternal 
mortality ratio was “16 per 100,000 live births in developed countries.” Maternal Mortality, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs348/en/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XK9S-VNJM (last updated May 2014). 
124 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy, Marine Corps Order 5000.12E W/CH 1–2, §§ 4(a)(1), 
4(a)(5) (Dec. 8, 2004). 
125 Steinmetz, supra note 109, at 42.  
126 ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 15. 
127 Id. at 15 & nn.64–65. 
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transgender service members, only ten male-to-female and six female-to-male 
service members would be unfit for duty each year.128  
Even if complications arise from SRS, they likely would not impact service 
duty, although they might be uncomfortable for the transgender individual. For 
example, some surgical complications for a male-to-female individual include 
complete or partial necrosis129 of the vagina and labia, or a vagina that is “too short 
or too small for coitus.”130 Surgical complications for a female-to-male individual 
include urinary tract infections, site scarring, and the inability to urinate while 
standing.131 These complications, while certainly uncomfortable, are unlikely to 
affect the ability to serve as none of these conditions are listed as disqualifying 
conditions under DoDI 6130.03.132 
Additionally, there are other surgeries that would exclude transgender 
individuals from serving in the military, but if a nontransgender individual 
underwent the same surgery, the ability to serve would be unimpaired. Breast 
surgery (either augmentation or reduction), for example, is considered a low-
complication procedure.133 A nontransgender woman could undergo breast 
augmentation surgery without affecting her enlistment eligibility. If a male-to-
female individual received that same surgery, that individual would be prohibited 
from joining the military,134 despite the fact that the surgery for the male-to-female 
patient does not differ from that being performed on a nontransgender woman.135 
  
2.  Hormone Therapy 
 
Another potential governmental concern for DoDI 6130.03 is the argument that 
hormone therapy will interfere with physical health in the military. This concern is 
two-fold: (1) that hormone therapy will deleteriously impact transgender service 
members’ health, and (2) that transgender personnel undergoing hormone therapy 
will be unable to access the necessary medication while deployed.136  
First, DoDI 6130.03 is substantially underinclusive with respect to the 
governmental concern that hormone therapy would negatively impact service 
                                                 
128 Id. at 5, 15–16.  
129 Necrosis is defined as “the death of living tissue.” Necrosis Definition, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/necrosis, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
889R-NJXS (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
130 See E. Coleman et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, 
Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People, Version 7, 13 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 
165, 204 (2011).  
131 Id.  
132 See DoDI 6130.03, supra note 4 (failing to list necrosis, urinary tract infection, 
genital site scarring, or the inability to urinate while standing as disbarring medical 
conditions). 
133 ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 15.  
134 See DoDI 6130.03, supra note 4, § E4.14(f). 
135 See Coleman et al., supra note 130, at 203. 
136 See Kerrigan, supra note 5, at 506–16. 
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members’ physical health because nontransgender individuals are allowed to ingest 
hormones without their ability to serve being impacted. The number of 
nontransgender individuals who take hormones while serving in the military is 
extensive: 1.4% of all service members (approximately 31,700)137 are taking 
anabolic steroids.138 In addition, 34% of all servicewomen (approximately 72,000) 
take hormones in the form of oral contraceptives.139 If ingesting hormones is a 
concern for military readiness, it would be more efficacious to target the 100,000 
nontransgender individuals taking hormones. Even assuming, arguendo, that every 
single transgender individual in the military undergoes hormone therapy, that 
amount is still less than one-sixth of the nontransgender individuals who are 
currently taking hormones in the military. Alternatively, if the hormones utilized in 
hormone therapy are problematic, the government could accomplish its interest by 
targeting the usage of specific hormones.  
Additionally, DoDI 6130.03 is not substantially related to the ability to dispense 
hormones if a transgender individual is deployed. A current deployment policy 
already requires that a minimum of 180-day supply of medications for chronic 
conditions be dispensed to all deployed soldiers.140 If other medications—including 
hormones—can be dispensed to soldiers who are serving in remote locations, it is 
unclear why hormones could not be dispensed to transgender individuals serving in 
remote locations. Even assuming, arguendo, that dispensing of necessary medical 
treatment in a remote location is problematic, the military could promulgate 
regulations that limit the geographic locations to which service members with 
medical conditions are deployed. This is already being done for diabetics: service 
members who take insulin cannot be deployed to areas where insulin cannot be 
stored.141 Similarly, pregnant women can only serve in remote areas if they are 
within six hours of emergency medical care.142  
One way to ameliorate the above cited concern about a transgender person 
undergoing hormone therapy, without impeding on transgender personnel’s ability 
                                                 
137 FRANCES M. BARLAS ET AL., DEP’T OF DEF., 2011 HEALTH RELATED BEHAVIORS 
SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL, at ES-8 (2013), available at 
http://www.murray.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/889efd07-2475-40ee-b3b0-508947957a 
0f/final-2011-hrb-active-duty-survey-report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5NHN-VNY5. 
138 An anabolic steroid is a “substance[] related to male sex hormones . . . [that is used] 
to treat some hormone problems in men.” Anabolic Steroids, MEDLINEPLUS, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/anabolicsteroids.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VN 
E3-TAZW (last updated Nov. 15, 2014). 
139 Lindsey Enewold et al., Oral Contraceptive Use Among Women in the Military and 
the General U.S. Population, 19 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 839, 840 (2010). Modern oral 
contraceptives “contain low doses of both estrogen and progestin.” Id. at 839. 
140 ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 13.  
141 U.S. Dep’t of Army, Army Regulation 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness 60 
(2011), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r40_501.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/A5QK-B2T8. 
142 Pregnancy and Military Operations, ALLIANCE FOR NAT’L DEF., 
http://www.4militarywomen.org/Pregnancy.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/8BDH-TGVP 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2014).  
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to serve, is to defer to medical professionals who are well-versed in the Standards of 
Care (“SOC”) promulgated by the World Professional Association for Transgender 
Health (“WPATH”).143 This would allow the professionals to determine if, and 
when, a transgender individual’s health would impede military readiness. Indeed, 
WPATH has already addressed the standards of care for transgender individuals who 
are undergoing hormone therapy while serving in remote locations.144 This 
alternative is effective because deferring to knowledgeable, qualified medical health 
professionals who are well-versed in WPATH’s SOC would accomplish the 
governmental interest of maintaining a level of physical health in the military, while 
maintaining continuity of care for transgender individuals. 
 
C.  Third Governmental Interest: Maintaining Psychological Health in the Military 
 
The third possible governmental interest for DoDI 6130.03’s blanket ban is that 
being transgender equates to psychological health issues, making transgender 
personnel unfit for military service.145 While maintaining a level of psychological 
health within the military is an important governmental interest, DoDI 6130.03 is 
not substantially related to such an interest.  
First, transgenderism is not a mental disorder. In May of 2013, the American 
Psychiatric Association (“APA”) noted this when it revised the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (“DSM”) to replace “gender identity disorder” with “gender 
dysphoria,” confirming that transgenderism is not a mental disorder.146 While the 
military often defers to the APA by updating its military regulations to reflect 
revisions in the DSM, such has not been the case with DoDI 6130.03.147 The APA 
is not the only voice urging that transgenderism not be seen as a mental disorder: 
WPATH has also urged the de-psychopathologization of transgenderism, stressing 
that gender nonconformity “should not be judged as inherently pathological or 
negative,”148 especially in light of research suggesting that transgenderism is a 
                                                 
143 WPATH is an “international, multidisciplinary, professional association whose 
mission is to promote evidence-based care, education, research, advocacy, public policy, and 
respect in transsexual and transgender health.” Coleman et al., supra note 130, at 166. The 
SOC aim is to help mental health professionals, surgeons, and others provide healthcare 
support to transgender individuals and to ensure “safe and effective pathways to achieving 
lasting personal comfort with their gendered selves, in order to maximize their overall health, 
psychological well-being, and self-fulfillment.” Id. 
144 See id. at 193 (describing the various methods that can be employed for those in 
“geographically remote or resource-poor areas”). 
145 See ELDER & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 7 & n.18. 
146 Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013) (describing gender dysphoria), with AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 576 
(4th ed., text. rev. 2000) (describing gender identity disorder). Gender dysphoria is broadly 
defined as discomfort or distress caused by a discrepancy between a person’s gender identity 
and that person’s sex assigned at birth. Coleman et al., supra note 130, at 166.  
147 Coleman et al., supra note 130, at 208. 
148 Id. at 168 (citation omitted).  
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biological condition that cannot be cured.149 All of this makes clear that 
transgenderism is not a mental disorder.  
If anything, discriminatory provisions, such as DoDI 6130.03, negatively 
impact transgender individuals’ mental health, as discrimination can cause minority 
stress. Minority stress is a socially-based condition that makes “gender-
nonconforming individuals more vulnerable to developing mental health problems 
such as anxiety and depression” because of the prejudice and discrimination directed 
towards them.150 In contrast, treatment that works to mitigate a transgender 
individual’s feelings of incongruence alleviates mental distress. Indeed, a meta-
analysis of more than 2,000 patients found that 87% of male-to-female patients and 
97% of female-to-male patients had improved psychosocial outcomes after 
undergoing such therapies.151 This suggests that a transgender individual’s mental 
distress is likely socially based, as opposed to pathological.  
Second, even if a transgender individual experiences minority stress, DoDI 
6130.03 is still substantially underinclusive. The military currently allows 
individuals with certain forms of mental illness to serve, provided certain criteria are 
satisfied, yet that allowance is not offered to transgender individuals.152 For example, 
nontransgender individuals suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD), depressive disorders, anxiety disorders, or phobias, are allowed to enlist 
provided certain criteria are met.153 Individuals in the military who suffer from mood 
or anxiety disorders are disqualified from serving only if their condition interferes 
with duty performance or requires extended or recurrent hospitalization.154 In fact, 
there were approximately 89,000 antipsychotic pills prescribed to military personnel 
heading overseas in 2008;155 thus, not only was the military aware of these mental 
health conditions, the military played an active role in trying to mitigate such 
                                                 
149 See Sam Winter, Transgender Science: How Might It Shape the Way We Think 
About Transgender Rights?, 41 HONG KONG L.J. 139, 145, 149–50 (2011) (noting there is 
accumulating evidence suggesting a biological basis, or a “hard-wiring,” for transgender 
identity, and including studies that found transgender individuals’ brains resemble those who 
share their gender identity, rather than their sex assigned at birth). This article also noted 
studies that show transgender individual’s performance on sex-differentiated cognitive tests 
resemble that of their gender identity rather than their birth-assigned sex. Id.; see also Jiang-
Ning Zhou et al., A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and Its Relation to Transsexuality, 
378 NATURE 68, 68–70 (1995) (arguing that the brain structure of transsexuals “supports the 
hypothesis that gender identity develops as a result of an interaction between the developing 
brain and sex hormones”). 
150 Coleman et al., supra note 130, at 168. 
151 ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 10. 
152 See DoDI 6130.03, supra note 4. 
153 Id. § E4.29(a), (g), (p). As an example of such criteria, an individual with ADHD 
must maintain a 2.0 grade point average after the age of fourteen to be eligible to enlist. Id. 
154 ELDERS & STEINMAN, supra note 6, at 11. 
155 Andrew Tilghman, ‘Any Soldier Can Deploy on Anything’: Pentagon Rules Bar 
Some Drugs from Combat Zone, but Oversight Is Suspect, ARMY TIMES (Mar. 17, 2010, 
12:11 PM), http://www.armytimes.com/article/20100317/NEWS/3170310/-8216-Any-
soldier-can-deploy-on-anything-, archived at http://perma.cc/LL4M-HZ95.  
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ailments. If the military has a genuine concern for a transgender individual’s mental 
health, it is unclear why an entire class of people are banned from enlisting based on 
a condition that is no longer considered a mental illness, while individuals with 
proven cases of actual mental illnesses are allowed to enlist. Hence, DoDI 6130.03 
is not substantially related to the proffered psychological health concerns in support 
of the blanket ban. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Discrimination based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination. In 
Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court clarified that “sex” encompasses more than 
biological genitalia. That ruling eviscerated the holding of Holloway, Sommers, and 
Ulane—the three cases the Tenth Circuit relied on in declaring that sex 
discrimination did not encompass gender nonconformity. At least since Price 
Waterhouse, discrimination against someone because of that individual’s failure to 
conform to sex stereotypes must be considered a form of sex discrimination.156 As 
transgenderism is defined as nonconformity “to that typically associated with the 
sex . . . assigned at birth,”157 discrimination based on gender identity is a form of 
discrimination based on sex. Furthermore, transgender individuals are either 
excluded from the military under DoDI 6130.03 because of the genitalia assigned at 
birth (which is discrimination based on sex), or because they are acting against the 
typical gender mores assigned to the sexes (which is discrimination based on sex 
stereotypes). Regardless, intermediate scrutiny applies.  
While maintaining unit cohesion and physical and psychological health within 
the military are important governmental interests, DoDI 6130.03 is not substantially 
related to these interests. Rather than banning all transgender individuals from 
serving, the military could conduct individualized assessments of transgender 
individuals’ physical and psychological health, as the military often does with 
others. This would accomplish the governmental interests without banning an entire 
class of people from serving their country. 
A blanket ban on transgender individuals, based on fallacious assumptions and 
arbitrary provisions, denies transgender individuals the right to serve in the armed 
forces. The military should welcome transgender individuals who are willing to risk 
their lives to defend this country. If, and when, DoDI 6130.03 is rescinded or ruled 
unconstitutional, a new tweet from the President will be in order. Then, and only 
then, would the President be correct in stating, “All Americans can now serve their 
country without hiding who they are.”158 
                                                 
156 While Price Waterhouse addressed this issue directly, equal protection and due 
process analysis also restricts discrimination based on sex stereotypes. See supra notes 78–
79 and accompanying text. 
157 Ross, supra note 10, at 188 (citations omitted). 
158 Obama, supra note 2. 
